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Abstract 
The financial sector is heavily regulated in order to prevent financial crises.  The 
recent crisis showed how ineffective this regulation and other types of government 
intervention were in achieving this aim.    We argue that the crisis was primarily caused 
by housing price bubbles.    These occurred because of too loose monetary policies and 
the easy availability of credit resulting from the build up of large foreign exchange 
reserves by Asian central banks.    A number of regulatory reforms are suggested.    It is 
also argued that central banks need to have more checks and balances.  Finally, the 
international financial architecture needs to be changed so that Asian countries do not 
feel the need to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the majority of countries the financial sector is the most regulated part of the 
economy.  The primary purpose of this regulation is to prevent financial crises.  The 
Crisis of 2007-09 has shown the inability of current regulation to achieve this goal.  The 
Basel Agreements provide a good illustration of the problem.  Despite the large amount 
of resources devoted to designing and implementing these in the last two decades, and the 
extensive international cooperation involved, these agreements did very little to prevent 
the crisis or lessen its effects.  The problem is that unlike other areas of regulation there is 
no coherent theoretical framework underpinning the measures.  In contrast, with 
environmental regulation, for example, it is widely agreed that the problem is a missing 
market.  Polluters do not need to compensate anybody for the damage that they cause.  As 
a result it is necessary for the government to step in and regulate emissions and so forth.  
Similarly, with antitrust regulation everybody agrees the problem that is being solved is a 
lack of competition.   
But with financial regulation, what are the market failures that justify 
intervention?  The Basel Agreements do not provide an answer to this question.  In fact 
there is no wide agreement among academics, practitioners or regulators on this issue.  
One view is that financial crises are mainly due to panics as argued by Friedman and 
Schwarz (1963) for the U.S. in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  As the 
seminal theoretical contributions by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have 
shown, if everybody believes there will be a panic, then the panic is self-fulfilling.  
Everybody will find it worthwhile to take their money out of the banking system.  2 
 
However, if everybody believes there will be no panic they will keep their money in.  
Another view is that crises are caused by the business cycle.  If people expect a recession 
then they will withdraw their money from the banking system in anticipation of loans 
going sour and the banks being unable to repay them.  Gorton (1988) and Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991) have provided evidence for this view using data from the U.S. in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  A third view is that financial contagion is a 
fundamental problem and provides a rationale for government intervention.  If one 
financial institution fails then other institutions holding claims on it may also fail.  Allen 
and Gale (2007) consider these and a number of other possible causes of financial crises.  
The current structure of banking regulation is a patchwork of measures resulting from 
the historical sequence of events rather than the implementation of a clear regulatory design. 
In the Great Depression, the economic situation was so bad that governments adopted a 
whole range of measures to stop any kind of problem. In the U.S., legislators passed the 
Glass-Steagall Act separating investment and commercial banking, they founded the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), they put in place all the SEC Acts,
1 and the 
financial system became heavily regulated.  In other countries, regulation was also increased 
and in some such as France, financial institutions were nationalized.  This regulation and 
government ownership was successful in terms of stopping banking crises.  From 1945 until 
1971, there were no banking crises, except for one in Brazil in 1962 that occurred together 
                                                 
1 The seven acts are: The Securities Act of 1933; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934; The Public Utility 
Holding Act of 1935; The 1939 Trust Indenture Act of 1939; The Investment Company Act of 1940; The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940; The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. 
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with a currency crisis (see Bordo et al. (2001)).  So it is possible to stop crises by stopping 
financial institutions from taking risks.  
However, the alternative to the private sector taking decisions about risks and the 
allocation of resources is essentially that the government determines who gets credit. This 
was done in different ways. In countries like France with nationalized banks, the government 
directly made decisions.  In the U.S., the government introduced so many regulations that 
banks couldn't take many risks and so low risk industries were allocated credit. As a result, 
the financial system stopped fulfilling its basic purpose of allocating resources where they 
are needed. In the 1970s it became clearer how inefficient this was and financial 
liberalization started in many countries. However, this led to a revival of crises. Since then, 
there have been crises all around the world (see, e.g., Boyd, De Nicolo, and Loukoianova 
(2009)). This historical evolution has led to a patchwork of regulations designed to stop 
particular problems rather than a well thought out way of reversing market failures in the 
financial system.   
In this paper we start in Section 2 by discussing the origins of the recent crisis and 
argue that the general pattern is similar to other major crises.  As Herring and Wachter 
(2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document, crises are usually the result of asset 
price bubbles, particularly in residential and commercial property.  When these bubbles 
burst, the real economy and the financial sector are adversely affected.  The current crisis 
provides a good example of this.  We argue that the property bubbles in the U.S., Spain, 
Ireland, and elsewhere were the result of two main factors.  The first was that central 
banks set interest rates that were too low during the period 2003-2004 at a time when 4 
 
house prices were already rising quite fast.  This set off the bubbles.  The second was that 
global imbalances, and in particular the acquisition of reserves by Asian central banks 
after the Asian Crisis of 1997 led to the easy availability of funds. 
In Section 3 we discuss how regulation and government intervention in the 
financial system should be reformed going forward.  Capital regulation is the major form 
regulation used internationally and this is discussed at length.  It is suggested that interest 
deductibility of debt for the corporate income tax should be eliminated as this would 
largely eliminate the social cost of requiring high equity buffers.  We argue that “Too big 
to fail” should not mean “Too big to liquidate”.  Ways of eliminating the problems posed 
by large complex cross-border financial institutions are proposed.   
Financial regulation is only one part of the intervention that is required to prevent 
crises and ameliorate their effects should they occur.  Section 4 discusses the role of 
central banks in causing the crisis through low interest rate policies and the reforms 
necessary to prevent this going forward.  Central banks need to be much more focused on 
controlling asset price inflation.  In addition their design needs to be changed to ensure 
that there are more checks and balances.   
Section 5 discusses how the international financial architecture needs to be 
redesigned to reduce the desire of Asian central banks to hold large reserves.  This will 
reduce the easy availability of funds that together with low interest rates played such a 
large role in creating the bubble. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes.    
 5 
 
2. The origins of the recent crisis 
 Despite its severity and its ample effects, the recent crisis is similar to past crises 
in many dimensions.  There have been crises in many other parts of the world in the last 
few decades.  Many of these were in emerging or middle income countries such as 
Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey, but many were in higher income countries.  The crises in 
Japan, Scandinavia, and Asia in the 1990’s stand out as being particularly severe.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document the effects of banking crises using an extensive 
data set of high and middle-to-low income countries over a long period of time. They find 
that systemic banking crises are typically preceded by credit booms and asset price 
bubbles.  This is consistent with Herring and Wachter (2003) who show that many 
financial crises are the result of bubbles in real estate markets. In addition, Reinhart and 
Rogoff find that crises result, on average, in a 35% real drop in housing prices spread 
over a period of 6 years.  Equity prices fall 55% over 3 ½ years.  Output falls by 9% over 
two years, while unemployment rises 7% over a period of 4 years.  Central government 
debt rises 86% compared to its pre-crisis level.  These averages are not that dissimilar 
from what happened in many countries in the recent crisis. 
This evidence from a wide array of financial crises suggests that the problems with 
subprime mortgages that marked start of the current crisis in August of 2007 were a 
symptom of the bursting of the property bubble rather than the cause of the crisis as many 
people initially believed.  No doubt they considerably exacerbated the crisis, though.  It was 
widely argued that what had happened was that the way the mortgage industry worked had 
changed significantly over the years. Traditionally, banks would raise funds, screen 6 
 
borrowers, and then lend out the money to those approved.  If the borrowers defaulted, the 
banks would bear the losses. This system provided good incentives for banks to carefully 
assess the creditworthiness of borrowers. Over time, that process changed and incentives 
were altered. Instead of banks originating mortgages and holding on to them, brokers and 
also some banks started originating them and selling them to be securitized.  The quality of 
the securitized mortgages was certified by the ratings agencies.  This process is termed the 
“originate to distribute model.”  According to this mortgage incentives view of the crisis, the 
whole procedure for checking the quality of the borrowers, and the mortgages underlying the 
securitizations broke down.  This analysis suggested that it would be fairly simple to solve 
the crisis and stop it from reoccurring. If the government regulated the mortgage industry to 
ensure everybody had the correct incentives, then this would prevent the problem in the 
future.  There seems little doubt that the changes in the mortgage industry exacerbated the 
crisis.  However, their absence in many other similar crises over the years suggests that they 
were not the primary cause.  
We shall argue that the basic problem that caused the crisis was that there 
was a bubble in real estate in the U.S. and also in a number of other countries 
such as Spain and Ireland. What happened is that the bubble burst, and this caused 
the huge problems in the securitized mortgage market and in the real economy. 
The bubble was large and global in many ways.  Figure 1 shows the Case-Shiller 
10-city index since 1990.  The figure illustrates the dramatic acceleration in house 
price increases in the early 2000s and their fall since July 2006.  Figure 2 shows 7 
 
the year-on-year change in this index.  It can be seen that the rise in house prices 
started in the late 1990’s and then took off in 2003 and 2004. 
What caused the bubble? We argue that there were two main causes. The most 
important reason that the bubble was so big in the U.S. was the policies of the Federal 
Reserve in 2003-2004. What they did to avoid a recession after the collapse of the tech 
bubble in 2000 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 was to cut interest rates to the very low 
level of one percent. Taylor (2008) has argued that this was much lower than in previous U.S. 
recessions relative to the economic indicators at the time captured by the “Taylor rule”.  
During this period housing prices were already rising quite rapidly.  For example, it can be 
seen from Figure 2 that the Case-Shiller 10-City composite index was growing at a rate 
above 10 percent throughout this period.   
The Federal Reserve created a significant incentive for people in many parts of the 
U.S. to borrow at one percent and buy houses going up at a much higher rate.  Unlike stock 
prices, which follow random walks, Englund, Quigley and Redfearn (1998) have found that 
house prices are positively serially correlated.  This means that if housing has been going up 
recently then this may continue for some time to come.  Lowering interest rates significantly 
below the current rate of house price appreciation thus created a profitable opportunity to 
buy property. 
In addition there were various other public policies that made it advantageous to buy.  
These included the tax advantages of being able to deduct interest on mortgages compared to 
the non-deductibility of rent payments, plus a number of other policies to encourage poor 
people to buy houses.  All these factors created a large demand for houses that led to 8 
 
increases in house prices as shown in Figure 2. Even when the Federal Reserve eventually 
started to raise interest rates in June of 2004, it was still worth borrowing because house 
prices continued to rise at a rate above 10 percent until 2006 as shown in Figure 2. Thus the 
Federal Reserve’s low interest rate policy was the first factor that really caused property 
prices to take off.   
The U.S. was not the only country that experienced a bubble in property prices.  
Spain and Ireland also had very large run ups in property prices.  Taylor (2008) argues that 
these countries also had loose monetary policies relative to the Taylor rule.  He points out 
that Spain, which had the largest deviation from the rule, also had the biggest housing boom 
as measured by the change in housing investment as a share of GDP.  Other countries in the 
Eurozone such as Germany did not have a housing boom because their inflation rates and 
other economic indicators were such that for them the European Central Bank’s interest rates 
did not correspond to a loose monetary policy.  
Loose monetary policy was not the only factor.  As Allen and Gale (2000, 2007) have 
argued, growth in credit is important for asset price bubbles.  The second important element 
in addition to low interest rates in the U.S., was global imbalances.  These helped cause a 
growth in lending in the countries with a loose monetary policy.  
Why are there global imbalances?  This is a complex issue.  However, we will argue 
that an important factor was the Asian Crisis of 1997.  Many Asian economies, which had 
done very well, like South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, fell into serious difficulties.  In 
the case of South Korea it was because its firms and banks had borrowed too much in foreign 9 
 
currency.  The country turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help to see them 
through these difficult times.   
In exchange for providing financial assistance, the IMF required South Korea to raise 
interest rates and to cut government spending.  That is the exact opposite of what the U.S. 
and Europe have done when faced with a very difficult crisis.  One potential reason why this 
happened is that the IMF is a European and U.S. dominated institution.  The head of the IMF 
up to now has always been a European while the head of the World Bank has always been an 
American. Asian countries are not represented at the highest levels. That was part of the 
arrangements that were made when the Bretton Woods agreement was negotiated at the end 
of the Second World War, even though it is not explicitly stated anywhere in the treaty.  The 
Asian countries did not have much weight in the governance process and their quotas (i.e. 
effectively their shareholdings) were small. All this implied that when the IMF imposed 
harsh policies on the Asian countries at the end of the 1990s, there was no effective 
mechanism for these countries to protest and argue that they had fundamentally sound 
economies.  
The consequence was that many Asian countries such as South Korea realized they 
had to become economically independent so that they would not need to go to the IMF to 
obtain relief from a crisis in the future.  To achieve this independence, these countries 
accumulated trillions of dollars of assets.  Figure 3 shows this accumulation of reserves by 
Asian countries (here China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan).  In 
contrast, Latin American and Central and Eastern European countries did not increase their 
reserves during this period.  10 
 
The motivation for accumulating reserves of China, which is the largest holder, is 
probably more complex than this. First, although they were not so directly affected by the 
Asian crisis, similarly to other Asian countries China realized that it would be risky to seek 
help from the IMF if they should need it in the future. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
it seems that China started accumulating reserves to avoid allowing its currency to strengthen 
and damage its exports.  Over time China’s reserves have continued to increase.  As of the 
end of the first quarter of 2010, they stood at the level of $2,447 billion.  One reason for the 
growth in reserves is the potential political influence this gives China, particularly with the 
U.S.  China has been increasing its military spending over the last few years.  Acquiring such 
large reserves gives them an alternative means of security.      
How were the Asian countries to invest these reserves?  One possibility could have 
been firms’ equity. However, it became difficult in particular for the Chinese to buy 
companies.  For example, when the Chinese state oil company CNOOC wanted to buy 
Unocal in 2005 the transaction was blocked by the U.S. authorities on the grounds that 
Unocal was a strategic firm. This happened on a number of other occasions. Thus, the 
Chinese ended up having to invest mainly in debt instruments. They bought a large amount 
of Treasuries, Fannie and Freddie mortgage-backed securities, and many other debt 
securities.  Similarly, other countries acquiring reserves also invested large amounts in debt 
securities. It can be argued that the large supply of debt helped to drive down lending 
standards to ensure that there was enough demand for debt from house buyers and other 
borrowers.   11 
 
Loose monetary policies and the increase in debt instruments available because of 
global imbalances were in our view two important factors responsible for the real estate 
bubbles.  However, various other factors also contributed to the bubble. One of these was the 
yen carry trade. This involved investors borrowing at zero interest rates in Japan and 
investing somewhere else such as in Australia and New Zealand at much higher rates. The 
carry trade involved an exchange rate risk, but most of the time it was possible to earn a 
significant return. There is not much information on how large the outflow of funds the yen 
carry trade involved but it may well have helped contribute to the rise in property prices in 
Australia, for example.  Currently, there is the question as to how much the carry trade from 
the U.S. is contributing to property bubbles in China and other parts of Asia. 
One important issue is the extent to which the problems in the real economy have 
been caused by the collapse of the bubble as opposed to spillovers to the real sector from the 
problems in the financial sector.  Spain provides an interesting example here.  It had a very 
large property bubble.  Its real economy has been very badly damaged with unemployment 
doubling.  However, its financial system is arguably the best regulated in the world.  The 
Bank of Spain implemented countercyclical loan loss ratios some time ago.  As a result its 
banks have come through the crisis much better than banks in other countries.  For example, 
Santander and BBVA were both able to expand their operations through mergers.  While the 
other banks did not do as well, they still did not require the large bailouts observed in many 
other countries.  The savings banks or Cajas had more problems but again these have been 
relatively limited.  Thus Spain provides an example where it seems that the bursting of the 
bubble has caused the most important damage to the economy.  Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this.  12 
 
Figure 4 shows the changes in GDP quarter by quarter.  It can be seen that Japan and 
Germany had much larger GDP falls than the U.S., France and Spain.  Figure 5 shows that 
despite their large falls in GDP, Germany and Japan’s unemployment rates have not changed 
very much since the start of the crisis.  However, unemployment in the U.S. and Spain, 
which had property bubbles, has approximately doubled.  This observation emphasizes the 
important need to prevent bubbles. 
 
3. Regulation and government intervention in the financial system  
In order to design effective financial regulation it is necessary to have a clear idea of 
the market failures that make intervention necessary.  The benefit of regulation is that it can 
correct market failures and potentially stop very damaging crises but the cost is that the 
regulation needed to prevent these crises may prevent the financial system from doing its 
task of allocating resources. In turn that slows down growth, innovation and ultimately 
damages efficiency.  The task of good regulation is to reduce the frequency of crises without 
impairing the operation of the financial system. 
The main market failures in the financial system are panics, contagion, and 
mispricing due to limits to arbitrage.  We next consider the various types of regulation that 
have been used to correct these failures. 
 
Designing capital regulation 
Capital regulations have been the main tool for regulating banks in recent years.  
These have been coordinated internationally through the Basel agreements.  They are the 13 
 
main tool for ensuring stability in the international financial system.  The traditional 
justification in the academic literature for capital regulation has been that it is needed to 
offset moral hazard from deposit insurance (for an exception, see Hellman, Murdock and 
Stiglitz (2000)).  Because banks have access to low cost funds guaranteed by the government, 
they have an incentive to take significant risks.  If the risks pay off they receive the upside, 
while if they do not the losses are borne by the government.  The argument is that capital 
regulation that ensures shareholders will lose significantly if losses are incurred is needed to 
offset this incentive for banks to take risks.  
This rationale raises the issue of why there is deposit insurance.  The usual answer is 
that this is needed to prevent bank runs that result from panics.  If people know that the 
government will cover any losses, it becomes rational for everybody to leave their money in 
the banking system thus eliminating panics.  However, in practice deposit insurance is only 
for small deposits, it does not cover large deposits or wholesale funding. As a result it does 
not solve the problem of panics.  One possibility would be to guarantee all forms of short 
term debt.  In this case there would again be a moral hazard problem.  A better solution to 
prevent risk taking may be to remove deposit insurance and deal with the problem of runs 
through lender of last resort policies.  If depositors know that the central bank will provide 
the needed liquidity if they attempt to withdraw early, they won’t withdraw and there won’t 
be a run.  Another view is provided by Skeie (2008).  He argues that in modern economies 
bank runs involve transfers of funds to other banks rather than withdrawals from the banking 
system.  As a result, the funds transferred out can be borrowed back through the interbank 
markets.  Skeie is able to show that for this reason there are no panics.  14 
 
Prevention of contagion is another rationale for capital regulation (see, e.g., Allen, 
Babus, and Carletti (2009) for a survey of the literature on contagion). Contagion is the 
market failure that central banks often use to justify intervention, as, for example, in the case 
of the arranged takeover of Bear Stearns in March 2008. As Chairman Bernanke stressed in 
his speech at Jackson Hole in August 2008 (Bernanke (2008)), Bear Stearns would have 
defaulted if the Federal Reserve had not saved it. That would have led to a whole chain 
reaction where many other financial institutions would have gone bankrupt. There might 
have been a complete collapse of the financial system.  
New theories of capital regulation based on preventing contagion are necessary.  We 
need to understand the determinants of the optimal capital levels to prevent contagion.  At 
the moment the literature on contagion is growing rapidly.  However, as yet there are few 
theories of capital regulation to prevent it.  
 
What is the cost of equity capital? 
One of the major problems in designing capital regulation is in modeling the costs of 
equity finance for financial institutions.  It is usually simply assumed in the literature that 
equity is more costly than other forms of finance (see, for example, Gorton and Winton 
(2003)).  However, it is not at all clear what this higher cost is due to.  One simple answer is 
that it is privately more costly because in many countries debt interest is tax deductible at the 
corporate level but dividends are not.  If this is why there is a desire to use debt rather than 
equity, then the simple solution is to remove debt interest deductibility.  We do not know of 
any good public policy rationale for having this deductibility.  It seems to have arisen as an 15 
 
historical accident.  When the corporate income tax was introduced interest was regarded as 
a cost of doing business in the same way that paying wages to workers was a cost.  However, 
from a modern corporate finance perspective, this is not the correct way to think about it.  
Equity and debt are just alternative ways of financing the firm.  If removing interest 
deductibility means financial institutions are willing or can be induced through regulation at 
little social cost to use more equity, then financial stability would be considerably enhanced.  
  Other possible rationales for the high cost of equity are agency problems within the 
firm.  According to this rationale the cost of equity is that it does not provide the correct 
incentives to shareholders or managers to provide the right monitoring.  High leverage is 
needed to ensure this.  There is little empirical evidence that this is in fact a severe problem.  
For example, leverage in private equity and venture capital firms where the agency problem 
seems much greater is typically less than in banks.  This lack of a convincing rationale for 
the social cost of equity suggests regulation should ensure capital buffers are made large 
since there is little social cost to doing this.  For example, if required capital ratios were 20 
percent, the financial system would considerable more stable than is currently the case and 
many more large shocks could be withstood.   
 
Contingent convertible debt (CoCos)  
  It has been widely suggested that convertible debt should be issued by banks that 
could be converted into equity in the event of a crisis.  In this case it would not be necessary 
for banks to raise capital in difficult times as it would already be available.  The issue of this 
kind of security by Lloyds in the U.K. is an example.  This certainly sounds attractive but the 16 
 
securities suffer from a number of potential problems.  First, there will be the issue of 
whether moral hazard is increased by such instruments.  Second, why not use equity from the 
start instead?  As we have argued above, there is no good evidence that equity is costly 
except for the interest deductibility of interest for the corporate interest tax and this should be 
removed.    
 
Capital adequacy regulation using accounting and market capital 
Another important issue concerning current capital regulation is that it is based on 
accounting book values rather than market values.  When Wachovia failed during the recent 
crisis its accounting capital was well above regulatory limits even though the market was no 
longer willing to provide funds.  There is no existing theory that we are aware of that 
suggests why capital regulation should be based entirely on accounting book values and not 
at all on market values.  We clearly need to investigate the extent to which capital adequacy 
regulation should be based on market capital rather than accounting capital. 
 
“Too big to fail” is not “Too big to liquidate” 
As long as a financial institution can maintain its required regulatory capital and 
funding from the market, then it will survive.  An important issue is what happens when it 
cannot do so.  Should it be allowed to fail or be bailed out?  One of the most important 
principles guiding policy during the recent crisis has been that large institutions are “Too big 
to fail.” The notion is that if a large financial institution is allowed to fail, this is going to 
cause many other institutions to fail all through the financial system.  This is the contagion 17 
 
problem discussed earlier. The way that this policy has been implemented is that 
governments have bought warrants, preferred shares and common stock in many institutions 
that would otherwise have failed.  They have made it clear that these institutions will be 
provided with the capital that they need in order to survive.   The effect of this type of 
intervention has been to provide a guarantee to long term bondholders as well.  There is very 
little in the way of current theory to justify these policies.  
It can be argued that current approaches are the wrong way to deal with the “Too big 
to fail” problem.  As Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008 illustrated, contagion 
is a very real problem and large banks and non-bank financial institutions should not be 
allowed to simply go bankrupt.  However, “Too big to fail” does not mean that these 
institutions should be allowed to survive.   
It is a very bad precedent to provide failing banks with the funds they need to survive.  
In the future, it is likely that banks and other financial institutions will grow and become 
large knowing that they will not be allowed to fail. These banks will be willing to take large 
risks since they receive the payoffs if the gambles are successful while the government bears 
any losses.   
“Too big to fail” does not mean “Too big to liquidate.”  Financial institutions should 
definitely be prevented from failing in a chaotic way.  The government should step in, take 
them over and guarantee their short term liabilities in order to prevent contagion.  The top 
executives should be removed and pensions cancelled just as though the institution had gone 
bankrupt.  Rather than allowing them to continue, these institutions should be liquidated in 
an orderly manner, even if this may take several years. That would allow the other 18 
 
institutions that did not fail and that were well-run to expand and take over the failed 
institution’s market share. Propping up the weak ones that did badly is not a good idea in the 
long term. It rewards risk taking and, perhaps more importantly, it prevents prudence from 
being rewarded.  Well-run banks that took limited risks and survived should be allowed to 
benefit. 
An important aspect of the scheme needed for the government to prevent contagion 
by temporarily taking over failing institutions before liquidating them is to have bankruptcy 
rules for all financial institutions that allow the equivalent of prompt corrective action for 
banks. With a bank, the government can step in before it goes bankrupt and take control. 
There doesn’t have to be a vote of the shareholders. Such a mechanism is needed for all 
financial institutions.   
  
Resolution of large complex cross-border financial institutions 
A major difficulty in designing a framework that allows financial institutions to be 
liquidated is how to deal with large complex cross-border institutions.  In particular, there is 
the problem of which countries should bear any losses from an international mismatch of 
assets and liabilities.  This has proved a thorny problem for the European Union in designing 
a cross border regime to support its desire for a single market in financial services.  For 
countries without the EU’s political ties, it is an even more difficult problem.  Designing 
such a system is one of the most urgent tasks facing governments. 
One possible way to proceed would be to eliminate cross border branching.  Then 
any subsidiaries would be regulated by the host country.  These regulators would be charged 19 
 
with ensuring that they were comfortable with any imbalances between assets and liabilities 
in their country.  They could require collateral in the form of securities to be posted to cover 
any excess of liabilities over assets within the country.  The regulators would be responsible 
for intervening should a foreign subsidiary or home institution come close to failing and 
would be responsible for covering any shortfalls of cross border assets and liabilities that 
failure would lead to. 
If capital regulation is designed so that large capital buffers are required, then 
institutions can be resolved when they hit thresholds of equity value that are also high, say 5 
or 10 percent.  This should ensure that the short and long term debt liabilities are more than 
covered by the assets.  Any remaining funds can paid to shareholders.  Using large 
thresholds in this way will help to minimize the likelihood that the assets of foreign 
subsidiaries, including any collateral, are unable to cover the liabilities within the country.   
A significant advantage of this type of scheme is that there is no need for 
international agreement on it.  Each country can unilaterally impose it.  This is not true of 
other types of scheme where any gaps between assets and liabilities must covered from other 
countries.  In this case there must be agreement not to “ring fence” assets.   
 
Limited government debt guarantees for financial institutions 
  In the current crisis holders of long term bank debt have effectively had a government 
guarantee.  An important issue is whether this is desirable.  Such a guarantee prevents 
disorder in bond markets, but again the guarantee provides undesirable long term precedents.  
Going forward holders of bank debt will know it is guaranteed and will not have any 20 
 
incentive to exert market discipline. If failing banks are taken over and liquidated in an 
orderly manner as discussed above, it should be possible to impose losses on long term 
bondholders.  This should provide incentives for market discipline by bondholders. 
 
Limits on leverage of financial institutions 
  Many financial institutions started the crisis with very high levels of leverage.  It has 
been widely argued that the deleveraging of these institutions during the fist stages of the 
financial crisis considerably exacerbated the effects of the crisis (see, e.g., Adrian and Shin 
(2009) and Greenlaw et al. (2008)).  We agree with this view.  Some limitations on the 
leverage of financial institutions seem desirable.  However, implementing such restrictions in 
practice may be problematic.  The issue will be exactly what should be included in debt and 
what should be included in equity.  Financial innovation will undoubtedly be used to try and 
circumvent any restrictions. 
 
Implementation of competition policy in the financial services sector 
There has long been a tension between competition policy and financial stability (see 
Carletti and Vives (2009)).  It is only in recent years that competition policies have been 
implemented in many countries.  Often for stability reasons, countries have avoided 
implementing competition in the banking sector as rigorously as in other sectors. 
An interesting question that has been raised during the crisis is why is it that in 
normal times financial services firms make such large profits.  One possibility is that it is 
because competition policy is not enforced properly.  Although on the face of it financial 21 
 
markets are very competitive, the nature of deviations from perfect competition is rather 
different than in markets for goods.  One illustration is “front running”.  This is based on 
knowledge of order flow by brokers and other participants in the market, which is extremely 
valuable.  For example, if a large buy order is executed then this will typically drive up 
prices because market participants will deduce that the buyer has good information.  If the 
processor of the order can trade before the large buy order is executed then it is possible to 
make money.  Aggregated over time this front running can be extremely profitable.  In the 
equity markets in the U.S. this is illegal.  There are very careful records kept of when orders 
are received and brokers can’t trade on their own account before they execute customers’ 
orders.  However, front running is not illegal in the U.S. bond markets.
2  The large 
investment banks have set up trading platforms for bonds that give them an advantage in 
terms of knowledge of order flow.  This has the potential to allow large profits from front 
running. 
It is important that deviations from perfect competition such as front running be 
carefully investigated and regulated.  Front running in the bond markets should be made 
illegal just as it is in the equity markets.  However, this is just one example where deviations 
from perfect competition are different in financial services.  There are many others that need 
to be understood and prevented. 
Restrictions on the size of financial institutions and their activities (the so-called 
“Volcker Rule”) have the potential to increase competition.  Such limitations would have 
done little to prevent the recent crisis but may nevertheless be desirable. 
                                                 




  As argued in Section 2, the basic cause of the recent crisis and many other crises is a 
bubble in real estate prices.  Perhaps the best way to prevent such bubbles is to avoid having 
very low interest rates at a time when property prices are surging.  Once they have started, 
the question is whether interest rates should be raised to prick them.  It may be possible and 
desirable to do this in economies with a high degree of homogeneity.  However, doing this 
may be difficult for political reasons.  At least initially when such policies are first 
introduced, it will be difficult to explain why it is worth causing a recession to burst a 
property bubble.  In heterogeneous economies like the U.S. and Eurozone, where there may 
be a large amount of divergence in the rate of property price increases, using interest rates to 
prick bubbles will not be so desirable because of the areas that do not have bubbles.  In this 
case it may be better to use other forms of macroprudential regulation to prevent bubbles.  
One example would be limits on loan-to-value ratios that would be lowered as property 
prices increase at a faster pace.  This can be effective for residential property but may be 
difficult to enforce for commercial property.  The reason is that firms may be able to use 
pyramids of companies that effectively increase leverage.  Another measure is to have 
property transfer taxes that are greater the higher is the rate of property price increases. 
 
Mark-to-market or historic cost accounting? 
Financial institutions have traditionally used historic cost accounting for many of 
their assets.  This is problematic if assets fall in value as they may able to hide this fact for 23 
 
significant periods of time.  A good example is the S&L crisis in the U.S. in the 1980’s.  This 
kind of episode encouraged a move to mark-to-market accounting in by the IASB and U.S. 
FASB (see, e.g., Allen and Carletti (2008a) and Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008)).  During the 
recent crisis it was not at all clear that market prices reflect fundamental values.  It has been 
widely suggested that limits to arbitrage allowed many asset prices, particularly those of 
securitized products, to break free from fundamentals.  As a result, mark-to-market 
accounting came under severe criticism by financial institutions and was relaxed by the 
FASB under political pressure from Congress. 
How should the advantages and disadvantages of mark-to-market accounting be 
balanced?  As long as markets are efficient, mark-to-market accounting dominates.  However, 
if as during times of crisis they cease to be efficient, market prices do not provide a good 
guide for regulators and investors.  The key issue then becomes how to identify whether 
financial markets are working properly or not.  Allen and Carletti (2008b) suggest that when 
market prices and model based prices diverge significantly (more than 2% say), financial 
institutions should publish both.  If regulators and investors see many financial institutions 
independently publishing different valuations they can deduce that financial markets may no 
longer be efficient and can act accordingly. 
 
A role for public sector banks in a mixed system   
Some countries such as Chile with its Banco Estado have a publicly owned 
commercial bank that competes with private sector banks.  In times of crisis, such a bank can 
expand and help stabilize the market as all market participants know that it is backed by the 24 
 
state and will not fail.  That's what many central banks have effectively been doing by 
buying large quantities of commercial paper.  These central banks have become like large 
commercial banks.  But the officials in charge of central banks do not usually have much 
expertise in running a commercial bank or know much about credit risk.  It would be better 
to have expertise in the public sector which allows the state to perform commercial banking 
functions during times of crisis.  These state institutions would also act as firebreaks and 
limit the damage that can be done by contagion. 
 
Reform of market structures 
A number of commentators have argued that the over-the-counter markets for many 
derivative contracts such as credit default swaps are opaque so that it is difficult to assess 
counterparty risk.  The suggestion is that these markets should be moved onto exchanges so 
that the counterparty risk can be more systematically dealt with and eliminated.  These 
suggestions have a lot of merit.  The problem is whether socially valuable niche markets for 
derivatives that do not have sufficient volumes to trade on exchanges will be eliminated as a 




  In the U.S. much has been made of the issue of consumer protection.  While there 
does seem evidence that consumers are taken advantage of by financial institutions, there is 
not much evidence this was a major cause of the crisis.  Much of the regulation that was put 25 
 
in place in the 1930s and 1940s with the SEC Acts was similarly meant to protect consumers.  
Strengthening this protection seems desirable.  In other countries such measures would be 
even more desirable.  In many European countries, for example, there seems to be very little 
in the way of consumer protection. 
We have argued above that the removal of tax deductibility of interest will allow 
large equity buffers at small social cost.  Such equity buffers would make it unnecessary to 
have countercyclical loan reserves.  With low equity buffers such countercyclical loan 
reserves are desirable.  
 
4. Checks and balances on central banks 
  Going forward, what else should governments do to minimize the risk of a future 
financial crisis?  What reforms in addition to changes in financial regulation and the other 
types of intervention discussed above should be undertaken?  There has been a tremendous 
focus on the private sector and what the private sector did wrong in terms of taking excessive 
risk. However, if the basic cause of the crisis was the real estate bubble and central banks 
played a role in creating this, it is really the public sector that took the main risks.  If there 
had not been a bubble in real estate prices there would not have been a problem with 
subprime mortgages.  If property prices had remained stable or continued to rise at a slower 
rate the default rate would have been manageable.  It is therefore important to try to prevent 
central banks from creating a similar problem going forward. In particular, we need to 
develop a system that provides a check on central banks to lessen the chance that they take 26 
 
risks in the way that the Federal Reserve did when it set interest rates so low in 2003 and 
2004. 
  In a report on the Second Bank of the United States, John Quincy Adams wrote 
“Power for good, is power for evil, even in the hands of Omnipotence.”
3  This statement 
reflected the considerable distrust of the concentration of power that central banks 
represented.  The controversy over whether a central bank was desirable came to a head in 
the debate on the re-chartering of the Second Bank in 1832. Although the bill was passed by 
Congress it was vetoed by President Jackson and the veto was not overturned. There was no 
central bank in the U.S. from 1836 until 1914. 
      There were many serious financial crises during the period the U.S. had no central 
bank.  The severity of the recession following the 1907 banking panic led to a debate on 
whether or not a central bank should be established in the U.S. The National Monetary 
Commission investigated this issue and finally in 1914 the Federal Reserve System was 
established.  The initial organization of the Federal Reserve System differed from that of a 
traditional central bank like the Bank of England. It had a regional structure and decision 
making power was decentralized. This meant it was ineffective at managing crises.  In 1933 
there was another major banking panic which led to the closing of banks for an extended 
period just after President Roosevelt took office. As a result of this, the Federal Reserve was 
reformed in the Banking Act of 1935, which centralized power in the Board of Governors. 
  During the recent episode the Federal Reserve System managed the crisis well.  
However, they did not do a good job in terms of preventing the crisis.  In fact, as argued 
                                                 
3 Timberlake (1978, p. 39). 27 
 
above, the case can be made that they were to a large extent to blame for the bubble that 
caused the crisis by setting interest rates so low at a time of rapidly rising real estate prices.  
The centralization of power particularly in the Board of Governors and the Chairman means 
that there are very few constraints on what they can do.  
After the inflationary experiences of the 1970s, many countries made their central 
banks independent. The rationale was that if they are independent, they will not succumb to 
political pressure to cut interest rates and cause an inflationary boom every time there is an 
election. This independence has worked very well for preventing inflation. However, this 
crisis has demonstrated that central bank independence may not be good for financial 
stability. There are a few people making decisions that are very important and there is very 
little in the way of checks and balances. For example, it seems that one person, Alan 
Greenspan, played a large role in the decision to cut interest rates to one percent in 2003 and 
to maintain them there until 2004 so as to minimize the effects of the recession. According to 
reports at the time there was not much dissension within the Board of Governors in terms of 
votes against the position he took. The low interest rate policy worked in the short run, but at 
the cost of a financial crisis and an enormous recession several years later. There should at 
least have been more public debate about the wisdom of the low interest rate policy at the 
time.  
It is important to stress that we are not advocating a return to political control of 
central banks.  There are other alternatives to provide checks on the system.  One possible 
reform is to impose a mandate of financial stability on the Federal Reserve.  This might help 
to ensure the risks involved for financial stability in undertaking various policies would be 28 
 
more thoroughly discussed and assessed.  Ensuring that there is a staff that focuses on 
financial stability issues may help to achieve this.   
Another possibility is to create a Financial Stability Board with its own staff and 
resources separate from the Federal Reserve that would not be dependent in any way on 
them.  Representatives from this Board could participate in Federal Open Market Committee 
meetings and could be given several votes.  Since their focus would be on financial stability 
issues they would necessarily focus on the risk created by the public sector. The Federal 
Reserve and monetary policy would be independent from politicians but there would be 
checks and balances. We believe some kind of reform along these lines would be helpful 
going forward. 
 
5.  Reforming the international financial architecture   
As mentioned above, the IMF arguably exacerbated the problem of global imbalances 
through the harsh policies that a number of countries were forced to undertake in the 1997 
Asian Crisis.  There was no reliable mechanism to stop this because the Asians are 
underrepresented in the IMF governance process.  In the last decade the Asian countries have 
produced a large proportion of global GDP.  They are the ones with very large reserves 
amounting to several trillion dollars. These are the countries with the economic power and 
arguably this should be reflected in the governance process of the important international 
organizations. In the recent crisis Asian countries such as South Korea have done much 
better than they did in 1997.  Rather than raising interest rates and cutting government 
expenditure as the IMF forced them to do then, South Korea cut interest rates and allowed a 29 
 
large fall in the value of their currency.  In contrast to the 1997 crisis when unemployment 
rose to more than 9 percent, it has only changed slightly in the current crisis. The reason that 
they were able to pursue these policies is that their large reserves meant they could make 
their own decisions and did not have to approach the IMF.  They ran their reserves down but 
they always maintained a large balance of reserves.   
While it is individually advantageous for countries to self-insure by accumulating 
reserves, this is an inefficient mechanism from a global perspective.  One method of 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves is for a country to lower the consumption of its 
people so that it can run a surplus. In this case there must be other countries that run deficits 
to offset these surpluses.  In practice the U.S. was the main country that did this.  Another 
way for a country to accumulate foreign exchange reserves is to borrow funds using long 
term debt and invest them in short term debt.  The buildup of reserves and short term debt 
through both mechanisms and their role in triggering the crisis meant that this was very 
undesirable.  This raises the question of what are the alternatives to self-insurance through 
the accumulation of reserves. 
The IMF can perform an important role by providing funds to countries that are hit 
by shocks.  If countries could always rely on being treated fairly and equitably and not being 
forced to implement harsh measures, there would not be a need to accumulate large levels of 
reserves.  In order for this to happen the IMF needs to reform its governance structure so that 
Asian countries play a much larger role.  This should be accompanied by an increase in 
Asian staff at all levels.  Unfortunately, current proposals do not go far enough in this regard 30 
 
and it seems unlikely that the IMF will be sufficiently reformed to make large reserves in 
Asia unnecessary in the short to medium run. 
A number of Chinese officials have made proposals for a global currency to replace 
the dollar.  This kind of approach has the great long run advantage that reserves can be 
created initially without large transfers of resources and the attendant risk of a crisis.  All 
countries could be allocated enough reserves in the event of a crisis so that they could 
survive shocks.  The problem with this proposal is that there would be a need for an 
institution to implement the currency.  It would need to be like the IMF.  There would again 
be the issue of whether Asian countries would be properly represented in the governance 
process.   
A more likely medium term scenario is that the Chinese Rmb becomes fully 
convertible and joins the U.S. dollar and the euro as the third major reserve currency.  With 
three reserve currencies there would be more scope for diversification of risks and China 
itself would have very little need of reserves in just the same way that the U.S. and Eurozone 
countries do not need significant reserves.  In our view this is one of the most practical 
solutions to the global imbalances problem.  China should start moving in the direction of 
making the Rmb fully convertible as soon as possible. 
One of the innovations that occurred during the crisis was the introduction of bilateral 
swap agreements between central banks for foreign exchange.  This had the great advantage 
of allowing many countries to obtain U.S. dollars, in particular.  However, these were one-
off agreements.  What many countries have argued is that these swap facilities need to be 
made automatic so that they can rely on accessing them in times of crisis.  Since these 31 
 
countries could then rely on this foreign exchange safety net, they would no longer need to 
hold such large reserves.  There would of who would bear the credit risk in such agreements.  
One possibility is for both sides to be required to post collateral.  This foreign exchange 
safety net would appear to be another important way to change the international financial 
architecture to reduce the need for countries to hold foreign exchange reserves.  Moreover, 
this scheme has the great advantage that it can be implemented in the short run. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have suggested three important reforms.  The first is that financial regulation and 
government intervention should be based on a coherent intellectual framework of correcting 
market failures and balancing its costs and benefits.  The second is that central banks need to 
be subject to more checks and balances than is currently the case.  The third is that the 
international financial architecture needs to be reformed so that Asian countries can rely on 
having access to foreign exchange in times of crisis.    
Many reforms in a wide range of areas are needed to prevent another crisis from 
occurring.  Unfortunately, there is very little consensus on what was the cause of the crisis 
and what needs to be done to prevent another one occurring.  In this paper we have outlined 
the view that the crisis was caused by loose monetary policy and global imbalances and have 
suggested a number of reforms.  Much work remains to be done in detailing these policies. 32 
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